Monday, December 17, 2007

Combat Skills Badge

Finally awarded my Combat Skills Badge more than 3 months after completing it! At least I won't feel so out of place now, with rank on my shoulders but no qualifications on my chest. Even though it is one of the easier skill badges, I think it at least shows that I can do the basics of what an infantryman is supposed to do.

Which brings me to my thought of the day:

I think that one of the intentions of the Combat Skills Badge was so that the infantry could have some 'pride'. However, I don't think that this intention was brought across properly. Walking across grassy, muddy, sandy, rocky, hilly terrain as well as doing a river crossing encompasses all the foot(non-motorised) movement that an infantryman is expected to do. The CSB differentiates the Infantry from the Armoured Infantry, which is expected to work more closely with vehicles, and is thus expected to do less foot movement. The technical handling tests and equipment handling tests shows that the Infantryman is capable of handling his weapons and equipment well, and the tests for all the organic weapons of an infantry section shows how the Infantryman is expected to be able to perform all the roles of the buddies in his section. Finally, the range after the 32km Route March shows how the Infantryman is expected to be able to fire his weapon and kill the enemy even when he is tired, wet and hungry.

The above is why I disagree that the CSB 32km should be treated as a 'Technical' exercise and should be treated as a 'Tactical' exercise. Sometimes I feel that in the drive to quantify gains and measure performance, we are missing out on the intangibles that motivate people. Like my Guards friend, Eng Soon, told me, the Guards Conversion Course is not just about learning to do the stuff that a Guardsman is expected to do, like heli-rappelling, but also about inculcating the Guards Culture into a person.

The Infantry has always been the basic arm of any army, which is why it is sometimes looked down upon. But as the war in Iraq shows, high technology can only do so much. In the end, it is boots on the ground that give a military effective control of a piece of land. And no one arm is more well situated to provide those boots on the ground than the common doughboy, the Infantry. This is how we can start to give the Infantry, the largest formation in our Army, in any army, pride.

Sunday, December 16, 2007

Biofuel's hidden costs

Just read an article about how the increasing use of maize-derived alcohol for vehicle fuel has driven up prices of cereal and is hurting the 3 billion poor people around the world. Maybe this will prompt people to think more about the hidden costs of 'environmentally-friendly' fuel and other items.. Is it worth it to starve other people so that you can feel better about yourself?

Sunday, December 09, 2007

GEN. Eric Shinseki (Retd.)...

...holds special interest for me because he was the one who pushed through the implementation of the Stryker, something which we (Infantry) are going to be doing soon. The story about him and the Iraq war is even more interesting, however. I quote from Wiki:

No, Major Montague shot back, it was more complicated: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the top commanders were part of the decision to send in a small invasion force and not enough troops for the occupation. Only Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff who was sidelined after he told Congress that it would take several hundred thousand troops in Iraq, spoke up in public. “You didn’t hear any of them at the time, other than General Shinseki, screaming, saying that this was untenable,” Major Montague said.

However it's also clear to these officers that publically stating contrary opinions comes with a high cost:

Yet, Major Hardaway said, General Shinseki had shown there was a great cost, at least under Mr. Rumsfeld. “Evidence shows that when you do that in uniform, bad things can happen,” he said. “So, it’s sort of a dichotomy of, should I do the right thing, even if I get punished?”


It seems that the same thing is occuring in the UK, at least judging from public forums and news reports.

I hope
that our NS policy means that there will be less disconnect between politicians and the military.

Saturday, December 01, 2007

How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social — Not Electronic

With the ever increasing emphasis on technological sophistication, let us not forget that what wins wars is not hardware but heartware...

http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-12/ff_futurewar